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10. West Germany's Arms Transfers 
to the Nonindustrial World 
Hans Rattinger 
If, in the past, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
concerning the transfer of military weaponry and equipment to the 
nonindustrialized countries had been representative of the policies 
followed by most other industrialized nations, a conference on this topic 
probably would never have been held. According to the U nited S ta tes Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in the years from 1961 to 1971 
the FRG was the world's largest importer of military hardware-second 
only to South Vietnam-but as a supplier it ranked eighth after the United 
States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and the People's Republic of China. 1 In the same period, its arms transfers 
amounted to a meager 2.2 percent of the world total and only 1.8 percent of 
all deliveries to developing countries. From 1969to1973, the West German 
share of total sales of major arms to the Third World (exduding both 
Vietnams) was as low as 0.6 percent, which is less than 0.01 percent of the 
average annual West German GNP.2 By international comparison, past 
West German arms transfers to the nonindustrial world could be described 
as almost a quantite negligeable; for the national economy, they certainly 
have been negligible. 
The reasons for this restraint are found neither in economic and 
industrial impotence nor in moral virtue. Rather, they are found in Jack of 
opportunity due to German demilitarization and the dismantling and 
conversion of its defense-related industries and in Jack of will due to 
historical experience and early mishaps that strongly advised against 
"playing with fire." When the FRG began to rearm after 1955, military 
preparations and activities were viewed as justifiable only as a means of 
self-defense in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. Armstransfers from the 
FRG were thus looked upon essentially as an instrument to enhance the 
capacity of the free world to defend itself. Not surprisingly, therefore, about 
70 percent of these deliveries have so far gone to NATO nations.3 One can 
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argue that it was precisely this West German focus on arms sales to NATO 
allies that drove other arms suppliers into Third World markets and thus 
forced them to cope with the political repercussions of such transfers; the 
Germans, meanwhile, were able to avoid these problems. 
Even though the delivery of German arms to NATO nations has at tim es 
led to domestic quarrels, as, for instance, in connection with Portugal's 
colonial wars, the military coup d'etat in Greece, and the Cyprus crisis, the 
main concern in the Federal Republic generally has been arms transfers to 
Third World countries, no matter how unimportant they were in 
quantitative terms. Over the years this concern has grown into a 
widespread public consensus that the FRG has more to lose than to gain 
from supplying developing countries with military armaments, a 
consensus that still provides the basis for the declaratory policy of the West 
German government. Despite this consensus, however, there is mounting 
evidence that West German arms transfers to the nonindustrial world are 
growing in importance and scale: in 1974, for example, the FRG's share of 
major arms deliveries to the Third World jumped to 2.3 percent. 4 As a 
result, an increasing number of strong voices are questioning the wisdom 
of current export restrictions and urging a radical revision of established 
dogmas. 
lt is my contention that during the next decade or so, the scope of West 
German supplies of military hardware to the Third World will expand 
considerably. The major uncertainties concern the extent to which the 
federal government itself will assume an active role in this process, the 
institutional and organizational arrangements under which it will 
develop, and whether it will require a formal revision of previous policy 
guidelines. On these points, the present chapter has little to offer but 
speculation, which is, therefore, confined to the concluding section. Less 
controversial answers can be given to questions aimed at the factors that 
have led to this new phase of arms transfers from the FRG to the Third 
World. For an appraisal 0f the complex interplay of economic, military, 
political, and social forces at work, it is necessary, as a first step, to review 
briefly the stages through which the FRG's arms transfers to developing 
countries have gone and what legal, political, and organizational 
restrictions have constrained them from the outset or along the way. lt 
will then be possible to examine West Germany's NATO role and its 
force requirements to get a clearer view of the types of military hardware 
Bonn will be able to offer. In subsequent sections, this potential for arms 
transfers will be related to Third W orld markets, and its economic dimen-
sion will be discussed. Finally, we will have to look at some special 
arrangements for West German arms transfers to nonindustrial states, 
arrangements that recently have grown in importance and that might 
considerably facilitate this kind of transaction, even if official policy 
changes but little. 
West Germany's Arms Transfers 
The Stages of West German Arms Transfers 
to the Third World 
The "Erratic Export Phase" 
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Throughout the l 950s, the FRG supplied only a few weapons to 
developing nations (see Table 10.1) and, accordingly, for all practical 
purposes could afford not to have an official policy concerning such 
transfers. The volume of defense production started to grow when West 
Germany joined NATO in 1955, but the lion's share of the emerging 
industry's output served to meet the needs of the Bundeswehr. Moreover, 
the pace of its expansion was severely curtailed by massive German 
purchases of weapons from the United States. The few deliveries of major 
arms from the FRG to developing countries during that time consisted 
almost exclusively of small surface ships carrying minor armament that 
were sold to Indonesia and to a few Latin American countries. As there was 
no systematic government involvement in those deals, the 1950s might be 
called the "erratic commercial phase." 
The "Military Assistance Phase" 
Around 1960 West Germany entered what may be termed the "military 
assistance phase" of its arms supplies to the Third World. There can be no 
doubt that the U .S. government's desire to place some of its defense burdens 
upon its NATO allies played a major role in initiating this phase, but it 
also was in line with the FRG's perception of its own security interests. By 
giving military as well as civiJian assistance to former colonies, especially 
in Africa, the Federal Republic could share some of the U.S. financial 
commitments and, at the same time, strengthen resistance to communist 
expansion and contribute to stability and peace in the recipient countries 
and regions. In addition, military assistance programs provided a 
convenient outlet for surplus weapons that had started to pile up, since 
much of the Bundeswehr's first-generation equipment, which had been 
hastily assembled in the late l 950s, was rapidly being replaced under offset 
agreements, with the United States. 5 Under two military assistance 
agreements, which were kept secret, Israel received a significant 
consignment of Bundeswehr surplus weapons: M-48 Patton tanks, 
transport, trainer and utility aircraft, helicopters, antiaircraft guns, and 
antitank guided missiles (MBB Cobra). Apart from Israel, major recipients 
of West German military assistanceduring this phase were Nigeria, Sudan, 
and Tanzania. These three African countries received patrol and coast 
guard vessels, light utility, transport and trainer aircraft, armored cars, 
mortars, rifles, parts for ammunition factories, and other military 
equipment and training worth about $50 million.s 
That the FRG did initiate military assistance schemes, notably to 
TABLE 10.1 
West German Tranefers of Major Arms to the Third World 1951-1974 
(1) (2)~--- (3)'"-----~ (5)" (6)* (7)* 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1954-57 
1954-55 
1955 
1956 
1956-57 
Recipient 
Egypt 
Indoneeia 
Indonesia 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Israel 
Number 
(2) 
10 
6 
Item 
Bllcker Bll 181 
training ship 
coastal minesweeper 
patrol boat 
coastguard vessel 
patrol boat 
Military Comment Honetary 
Assistanc:e (MA) Value per 
Comm.ercial (C) Year 
c 
prior to statt of 
local product:fon 
810t, 1953 
139t' 1954-57 
45t, 1954-55 
146t, 1955 
%t, 1956-57 
0 
~ 
(1) 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1958-59 
1959 
1959-60 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1962-65 
1962-65 
(2) 
Reeipient 
South Africa 
Indonesia 
Colombia 
Uruguay 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Katanga 
Zaire 
Israel 
Sudan 
(J) 
Number 
24 
1 
(500) 
97 
(4) 
Item 
Dornier Do-27B 
patrol boat 
oiler 
patrol boat 
fast patrol boat 
Jaguar class 
Sikorsky S-58 
surveying vessel 
patrol boat 
Dornier Do-28 
Dornier Do-27 
MBB-Cobra 
Saladin 
(5) 
Military 
Assistanc.e (MA) 
Commercial {C) 
c 
c 
c 
MA 
MA 
MA 
m (6) 
Conment Monetary 
Value per 
Year 
140t, 1958-59 
22682t, 1952 
70t, 1958 
150t. 1959-60 
bought for Bundes-
wehr but diverted to 
Israel with U. S, 
approval 
870t, 1960 
7St, 1961 
26 
23 
~ 
(1) 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1964-65 
1965 
(2) 
Recipient 
Tunisia 
Malagasy 
Nigeria. 
Nigeria 
Zaire 
(j) 
Number 
1 
3 
2 
14 
2 
Nigeria 20 
Ruanda 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Mexico 
Colombia 
Israel 
Thailand 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Tanzania 
Pakistan 
10 
(15) 
3 
20(}+-
2 
1 
5 
8 
2 
(500) 
~ 
~ 
TABLE 10.1 (Cent.) 
(4) (5) . -~ <W C7J 
Item Military Comment Monetary 
Assistance (MA) Value per 
Comme:t"cial (C) Year 
10 
patrol boat c 75t, 1962 
patrol boat MA 46t 
Noratlas MA 
Piaggio P .149D MA 
Dornier Do-27 MA 
20 
Dornier Do-27 15 MA, 5 C 
Dornier Do-27 ? 
Dornier Do-27 MA 
Coastguard boat MA 50t 
patrol boat MA 112t, lat.er 
transf, to Kenya 
Piaggio P .149D ? 
1111-Kll c APC 
coastguard vessel c 129, 5t, 1963 
M-48 Patten MA ex-Bundeswehr 
10 
patrol boat c delivery uncertain 
fast patrol boat c 
Fouga Magister MA deli very uncertain 
Piaggio P .149D MA 
Dornier Do-28 MA 
MBB Cobra c built under licence in 
Pakistan 
(1) 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1969-70 
(2) 
Reeipient 
Pakistan 
Ind1a 
Niger 
Venezuela 
Southern Yemen 
Tunisia 
Israel 
Morocco 
Morocco 
Cam.eroon 
Ghana 
Saudi Arabia 
(3) 
Number 
90 
24 
2 
74 
25 
24 
2 
l 
5 
Tunisia 1 
Argentina (60) 
(4) 
Item 
F-86 Sabre 
Seahawk MK 100/ 101 
ri ver gunboat 
F-86K 
Douglas DC-3 
patrol boat 
Fouga Magister 
Fouga Magister 
patrol boat 
Dornier Do-28 
fast patrol boat 
fast patrol boat 
Jaguar class 
patrol boat 
(5) 
Military 
Assistance (MA) 
Commercial (C) 
c 
c 
MA 
c 
c 
c 
c 
MBB Bo 810 Cobra 20/'JO 
c 
c 
(6) 
Comment 
illegally transf. 
via Iran 
illegally transf. 
via India 
75t, 1966 
eX-Bundesweht' 
170t, new 
325t, ex-French 
(7) 
Monetary 
Value per 
Year 
64 
13 
~ 
(1) 
Year 
1970 
1970-71 
1971 
1971-72 
1972 
1972-73 
1973 
(2) 
Recipient 
Niger 
Ethiopia 
Niger 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
Singapore 
Peru 
Brazil 
(3) 
Number 
1 
1 
2 
10 
106 
4 
3 
112 
4 
TABLE 10.1 (Cont.) 
(4) 
Item 
Noratlas 
Reims-Cessna 
337 Skymaster 
Aero Commander 500 
Douglas DC-6B 
UR-416 
UR-416 
coastal minesweeper 
fast patrol boat 
Manta class 
missile boat 
Jaguar class 
UR-416 
Aerospatiale/MBB 
Roland 
(5) 
Military 
Assistance (MA) 
Commercial (C) 
MA 
MA 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
(6) -(7) 
Comm.ent Monetary 
Value per 
Year 
ex-Luftwaffe 
19 
ex-Luftwaffe 
light AC 
light AC 
230t • new 
carries Exocet 
SSM 
28 
120t, new, licence 
for several more granted 
light AC 
8 launchers, assembly 
in Brazil, delivered 
together with Marder APCs 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1973-74 Philippines MBB Bo lr:l5 c 
~ 
0\ 
(l) (2) -
-
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year Recipient Number Item Military Cormnent Monetary 
Assistance (MA) Value per 
Comrnercial (C) Year 
1974 88 
Iran 3 patrol boat c 70t, possibly 
delivered 1975 
Israel (15) Dornier Do-28 c 
Lebanon 3 patrol boat c possibly 
delivered 1975 
Ethiopia 2 Dornier Do-28 MA 
Ghana (1 or 2) patrol boat c 160t, one unit 
possibly del. 1975 
Nigeria 8 Dornier Do-28 
Nigeria 4 MBB Bo-105 
Zambia 10 Dornier Do-28 
Argentina 1 submarine, type 209 c 1, OOOt, second to be 
operational in 1975 
Argentina 2 fast patrol boat, c 240t, one or two uni ts 
type S 148 possibly del. in early 
75, carries Exocet SSM 
Brazil 2 coastal minesweeper c 4 delivered 71-72, 4 tnore 
under construction 
Colombia 2 submarine, type 209 c l,OOOt, probably del. 1975 
Ecuador 3 fast patrol boat, 119t, carries Exoc.et SSM 
Manta class 
*Notes to colwnn: (1-2) Deliveries extending over several years are mentioned in the year in which delivery began. 
(3) Parentheses indicate uncertain information. 
Sources: 
(4) For a glossary of weapon systeros, refer to SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, 
pp. 131-148. 
(S) Sources: SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, Table 9. 2, pp. 310f.; 
H. Hatendorn, Militaerhilfe und Ruestungsexporte der BRD, Duesseldorf, 1971, 
Table 6, pp. l22-125. 
(6) Years
6
appearing in this column indicate date of construction. 
(7) In 10 constant (1973) U.S. dollars. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1975, Table 8B. 
2„ PP· 220f. 
SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers is the main source. Information for the years from 1967 on-ward has 
been checked against the annual issues of Military Balance, published by the International 
Institute for Strategie Studies. For 1973 and 1974, SIPRI Year books and the Military Balance 
have been used as primary sources. ~ 
'J 
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African countries, was certainly an outcome of Alliance politics. Once they 
got under way, however, they were also utilized as instruments for pursuing 
German national interests, especially so in the FRG's "containment" 
policy vis-a-vis the German Democratic Republic. Even though there was 
no explicit link to the Hallstein Doctrine, recipients of military assistance 
were expected to take into account the FRG's claim tobe the sole legitimate 
German state. Whether this approach was effective is almost impossible to 
ascertain, since the recipients of West German military assistance generally 
have received far more impressive civilian aid from the FRG; thus, their 
general compliance with German expectations might weil be ascribed to 
their reluctance to jeopardize the nonmilitary programs. 1 
The "military assistance phase" of the FRG's arms transfers to 
nonindustrialized countries ended rather abruptly after Bonn's foreign 
policy debade, which stemmed from the attempt in 1965 to carry through 
the military assistance agreements concluded with Israel. The West 
German government under Chancellor Erhard had to rethink the whole 
concept of the FRG's military assistance programs to countries outside 
NATO and was forced to conclude that they obviously had not been large 
enough to yield international leverage but had been far too large to remain 
inconspicuous. In order to save face, it was decided not to give military 
assistance to "areas of international tension" in the future. 8 Existing 
programs were quickly deprived of their military character by converting 
them to equipping and training internal security forces. By 1968, most of 
them had been redirected even further into the field of civilian assistance by 
stressing the development of infrastructure, especially transportation and 
conimunication facilities, 9 thus passing beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Similar caution was exerted with respect to Bundeswehr surplus 
weapons: when the army, in 1965, began to phase in the first Leopard 
tanks, most of the M-4 7 Pattons they replaced were sold to allies or used as 
targets and afterward scrapped. 
As in the fiasco over military aid to Israel, which had completely 
shattered the federal govemment's self-assured approach to military 
assistance to developing countries of the early l960s, a series of events in 
1966 also discredited commercial or quasi-commercial arms transfers to the 
Third World and thus completed the transition to a third phase of the 
FRG's policy toward armament transfers. In that year, the private firm, 
Merex Co., which had specialized in exporting Bundeswehr surplus 
weapons, purchased ninety F-86 Sabres and twenty-eight Seahawks plus 
spares from Vebeg, a state-owned company responsible for the sale of such 
surplus stock. After sales to Iran and Italy had been negotiated and the 
required end-use certificates had been presented, official permission to go 
ahead was granted by the governments of West Germany, Canada, and the 
United States. Canada and the United States were involved because the 
Sabres originally had been built in Canada under U .S. licenses. The Sabres, 
however, wound up in Pakistan and the Seahawks in India, both at the time 
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certainly "areas of international tension." 10 In the meantime, the trial 
against Merex has revealed that the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) 
(Federal Information Agency) was involved in those deals. 
The "Quiet Commercial Phase" 
The fiascoes of 1965-66 have been mentioned briefly, because the 
subsequent practices and doctrines concerning FRG arms transfers to the 
nonindustrial world can be understood only against this background. The 
obvious consequences of these events were to lend a more civilian touch to 
military assistance to developing countries, to restrict military aid proper 
to NATO allies, and to transfer the disposal of Bundeswehr surplus from 
private "merchants of death" to the Ministry of Defense, which, together 
with the Foreign Ministry, bears an unambiguous political responsibility. 
In addition, consideration was given to whether commercial arms transfers 
of new, as well as of surplus, weapons should not also be entirely confined 
to NATO nations and how-in the light of the Seahawks' passage to India 
via ltaly-such restrictions could be enforced by a more rigid application of 
end-use requirements. This discussion received additional momentum 
from a number of internal political developments. In late 1966, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), whicb bad severely criticized the FRG's military 
assistance programs as well as surplus sales to the Third World, formed a 
"Great Coalition" with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and tben, 
in 1969, forced the CDU into opposition. The late 1960s also saw the apogee 
of student unrest and the New Left movrment and, consequently, a public 
opinion and parliamentary environment that increasingly disapproved of 
all kinds of weapons supplied to the Third World. 
When the SPD took power, most West German military assistance 
programs to Third World countries had been "demilitarized," a few new 
ones had been begun, and old ones were continued mainly so as not to 
offend old patrons. 11 The FRG's arms transfers to the developing nations, 
therefore, had again shifted to a commercial phase-as a result of the 
turbulence of the mid-1960s. Exports of armaments to these regions, 
however, had to take place under severe constraints: concerned industries 
bad to keep a low profile in view of parliamentary efforts to block such 
exports entirely, 12 and tbe decision to prevent arms supplies to "areas of 
tension" kept West German firms outof the markets exhibiting the highest 
demand for sophisticated weaponry. From 1967, as a consequence, light 
aircraft and small surface ships again became the most prominent items on 
the FRG 's export !ist, and most of them were supplied to African and Latin 
American countries. Whereas in tbe "military assistance phase" the federal 
government had been the primary actor and the responsible party in most 
arms tranfers to the nonindustrial world, private enterprise now took the 
initiative. Because of the low volurne of arms sales to developing countries 
and the discretion witb which they were transacted, this period fol-
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lowing the mid-1960s might appropriately be termed the "quiet com-
mercial phase." 
The separation of political responsibility and commercial activity, 
which is characteristic of this phase, will certainly remain a guideline of the 
FRG's arms transfer policy and has allowed the gap between declaratory 
and operational policies to widen, thus paving the way for a possible fourth 
"open commercial phase." (lndeed, a few years hence we might look back 
on 1976 as the year when this new phase began.) As to dedaratory policy, 
1971 saw the culmination of the efforts to block almost all arms deals with 
countries outside NATO. In line with its Friedenspolitik ("policy of 
peace")-the most important component of which, of course, was the 
Ostpolitik-the federal government decided to ban such transfers 
entirely.13 "The federal government has decided upon guidelines for the 
export of military weapons and other armaments. The trade in military 
weapons is to be curtailed. As a principle, they are not to be exported to 
countries outside of NAT0."14 
Opposed to this statement of principles stand the facts. Arms transfers 
from the FRG to the nonindustrial world did not stop in 1971 or thereafter. 
Quite the contrary. In 1975 (more recent data are still unreliable), the 
financial volume of the export of major arms reached its all-time high (see 
Table 10.1 for details). Most of these transactions were commercial in 
nature, and a number of the relevant agreements had been concluded at the 
same time the West German government pledged to cut off all arms 
transfers except those to NATO allies. Accordingly, the defense white 
papers published in 1974 and 1976 refrained from repeating such an 
unambiguous commitment. 
The primary reason for the deviation of actual practices from 
pronounced principles is the weight the FRG's armament industry has 
gained over the years. Extensive production under U .S. licenses for 
Bundeswehr needs led to a rapid expansion of expertise, experience, and 
manufacturing capacities, and expansion that by the mid-1960s was 
already generating indigenously designed weapons that met international 
standards, especially in the fields of armor, antitank weapons, missile 
boats, and small submarines. In the meantime, German industry, either 
alone or through international collaboration, has begun to produce or 
currently has under development almost all major weapons systems for the 
Bundeswehr. Although its production program is almost exclusively 
geared to the Bundeswehr's force requirements, derived from Germany's 
NATO role, it has also encountered lively demand from NATO allies as 
well as from developing nations. These changes have caused the FRG's 
armaments industry to regain self-assurance and to seek a more active role 
in international markets, a process that has received additional momentum 
from the current economic crisis but that clearly runs counter to the federal 
government's declaratory policy. Before discussing in more detail the 
political, military, and economic dimensions of these recent develop-
ments-which might soon bring us into an "open commercial phase" of 
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West German arms transfers to the Third World-let us briefly look at the 
restrictions to which such transfers are subject. 
Legal, Organizational, and Political Constraints 
on West Germany's Arms Transfers to the Third World 
Article 26 of the Federal Republic's constitution states as a general 
principle that "weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, 
transported, or marketed only with the permission of the federal 
government." Along with the restrictions placed in the WEU treaty on the 
types and sizes of major weapons systems that West Germany could 
produce, this provision remained the only legal basis of arms transfers from 
the FRG until l 961, so that their first phase can also be called "erralic" with 
respect to political and legal controls. In 1961, a series of unpleasant 
incidents over small arms deliveries to Morocco led to the passing of the 
Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade Act.15 The Weapons Control 
Act established procedures and criteria under which permission to export 
weapons from the FRG would be granted or withheld, and it contains an 
exhaustive !ist of weapons to which it applies. The Foreign Trade Act 
created a legal basis for interfering with foreign trade if it appeared that 
foreign trade might jeopardize the security or the foreign relations of the 
FRG or peaceful relations among other countries. 16 
According to the Weapons Control Act, the permission of the Ministry of 
Economics and one of its federal agencies (Bundesamt für Gewerbliche 
Wirtschaft) has to be obtained for all commercial exports of weapons and 
military equipment. The Ministry of Economics has to secure the approval 
of the Foreign Ministry, especially its foreign trade division and all 
regional and country desks involved. Decisions on military assistance as 
well as military training assistance are taken by the Federal Security 
Council (Bundessicherheitsrat), a government committee headed by the 
chancellor. 
Following the uproar over military assistance to Israel and the diversion 
of combat aircraft to India and Pakistan, additional rules were adopted. 
Neither military assistance nor commercial arms transfers from the FRG 
should go to areas of international tension, and recipients of either should 
have to commit themselves not to transfer any equipment to third parties 
without the consent of the West German govemment. In addition, 
recipients' customs authorities have to acknowledge officially the import 
of commercial arms transfers from the FRG to make sure that deliveries 
actually reached their destination. 
What is missing from this tight web of legal and political restrictions on 
arms transfers from the FRG are instruments of parliamentary control. lt 
was not until 1964 that funds spent on military assistance were officially 
detailed in the federal budget and thus became amenable to parliamentary 
intervention. 17 As the bulk of West German armament transfers to the 
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nonindustrial coumries after 1966 has shifted from military assistance to 
commercial transactions, the Bundestag's controlling powers have become 
largely irrelevant-at least as far as transfers to developing countries are 
concerned. With regard to commercial exports of weapons, there is no 
instrument of parliamentary leverage in the FRG comparable to the U .S. 
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, and, surprisingly, so far there have been 
no initiatives to create such an instrument. Since the early l 960s, there have 
been unsuccessful attempts to extend the Weapons Control Act and the 
Foreign Trade Act to the supply of machinery and know-how for weapons 
and ordnance production to foreign countries as well as to related acti vities 
of German nationals abroad. 18 As will be seen below, arrangements of this 
kind have recently grown in importance for circumventing the export 
restrictions described above. 
West Germany's NATO Role and Force Requirements 
and Arms Transfers to the Third World 
Army 
As the recovery of the West German armaments industry has tobe seen in 
connection with the FRG's integration into NATO, its current and future 
production programs and therefore its array of potential export items are 
also mainly derived-at least as far as major weapons systems are 
concerned-from the force requirements of the Bundeswehr and thus, 
indirectly, from its NATO role. 19 Since the Bundeswehr supplies one-half 
of the allied ground forces in Central Europe, forces that face the bulk of 
Warsaw Pact armor, it is only natural that its antitank role has always been 
the primary concern of the WestGermanarmy.2° Accordingly, the Leopard 
main battle tank and the first-generation antitank guided missile Cobra 
were among the first pieces of more sophisticated equipment tobe designed 
in the FRG. 
Leopards, which entered production in 1965, have been received or 
ordered by Belgium, Denmark, ltaly, the Netherlands, and Norway, and, 
outside NATO, by Australia.21 Iran, Spain, Switzerland, Greece, Turkey, 
Canada, and South Africa have all indicated interest in purchasing 
Leopards or building them under license.22The follow-on model, Leopard 
2, is currently in the final stages of development and has gone through 
comparativeevaluation with the XM-1 in the UnitedStates.23 Upto1971, at 
least 22,000 Cobras have been exported, three-fourths of them to the Third 
World, with the Middle East being the major recipient.24 They have been 
purchased or built under license by Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and 
Pakistan. 
The Bundeswehr's requirements for the Leopard 2 stress mobility, 
firepower and protection, in that order. Mobility is also an important 
consideration in West German mechanized infantry tactics, and this has led 
to the development of the Marder APC (armored personnel carrier), for 
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which there is considerable demand from less developed countries. Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, wants to buy 800 Marders, but so far the federal 
government has refused to grant an export license. In view of Central 
European terrain and highway and rail networks, mobility is not 
necessarily tied to comprehensive cross-country capability. Therefore, a 
family of wheeled armored cars has been designed, for instance the UR-416, 
which also meets the requirements of developing states, especially in the 
counterinsurgency field. 
With respect to second-generation antitank PGMs (precision-guided 
munitions), West German and French industries in collaboration have 
developed the MILAN and HOT systems. MILAN is a man-portable 
infantry weapon, which can also be mounted on the Marder APC; HOT 
will replace the SS-11 missiles on the Bundeswehr's 320 missile-tank-
destroyers but can also be mounted on the MBB Bo-105 light helicopter. 2s 
Since France and the FRG are already the two major Western exporters of 
antitank PGMs to the Third World and to the rest of NATO as well, these 
two systems are almost certain to find their way abroad in considerable 
q uantities. 
Advanced weapons are being developed and produced for the 
Bundeswehr not only in the field of armor and antiarmor but also in 
supponing systems, such as artillery and air defense. Great Britain, ltaly, 
and the FRG are currently testing a new l 55mm field howitzer FH-70, and a 
self-propelled version (SP-70) is under development. 26 The first of a total of 
432 Gepards, an antiaircraft tank utilizing a Leopard chassis and mounting 
a 35mm twin cannon, will enter service in 1976. Another 150 Gepards have 
been ordered by Belgium and the Netherlands.21 Mobile air defense will be 
reinforced further by the German-French Roland missile, which is 
mounted on the Marder APC and is especially designed to operate against 
low-flying aircraft: So far, the Bundeswehr has ordered 140 units of this 
system, which has also been tested by the United States; a small number of 
them have already been exported to BraziJ.28 
As to the prospects for exports of this array of sophisticated weaponry, it 
seems safe to assume that all systems mentioned above will be transferred to 
NATO allies in due course. For Third World markets, Leopard tanks, 
Marder APCs, armored cars, and second-generation antitank weapons are 
the most attractive items. Mobile air-defense systems such as Gepard and 
Roland, on the other hand, make sense only if-as is the case in the Middle 
East-prospective enemies possess modern ground-attack aircraft. 
Navy 
Although West German shipyards participated in FRG rearmament 
from the beginning, they were constrained by WEU ceilings on the 
displacement of surface fighting ships (l,500 tons) and submarines (450 
tons) that could be built. On the other band, these restrictions coincided 
with the role that the West German navy took within NATO and the ships 
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that were required to perform this task, i.e., to prevent the Baltic Sea from 
becoming a mare nostrum for the USSR and to contribute on a limited scale 
to securing the North Sea.29 The West German shipbuilding industry has 
accordingly specialized in fast patrol boats, which have increasingly been 
armed with ship-to-ship missiles, and in small conventional submarines 
with wire-guided torpedoes as their main armament. Six frigates (Cologne 
dass) and four destroyers (Hamburg dass) have also been constructed with 
WEU permission. 
Thus far, fast patrol boats have been the FRG' s major export success with 
regard to Third World navies, and this success is likely to continue. 30 West 
German shipyards already produce two types of advanced-design fast 
missile boats (type 148, 250 tons; type 143, 350 tons) for the Bundesmarine, 
which have also been in demand from developing countries, notably in 
Latin America. In 197 4, Argentina ordered two type-148 boats, and 
Ecuador purchased six smaller missile boats. Turkey recently contracted 
for the construction of several boats of the new SAR-33 dass, which might 
also look attractive to recipients outside NAT0. 31 The only major surface 
ships currently projected by the FRG navy are twelve 122-class frigates, 
which will be produced jointly with the Netherlands and are to replace 
three Fletcher-dass and four Hamburg-dass destroyers, as well as six 
Cologne-class frigates from 1981to1990.32 A Third World market for these 
ships is not foreseeable. 
Though the West German contribution to the buildup of Third World 
navies has mainly been the delivery of fast patrol and missile boats, NATO 
allies have preferred small German submarines. In the I960s, Norway 
bought fifteen type-207 boats (350 tons); Greece received four type-209 
submarines {l,000 tons), and three more are under construction; and 
Turkey has also ordered three type-209 boats, of which one has already been 
delivered. When WEU permission to build the first four boats for Greece 
was not forthcoming, they were completed under the WEU permission to 
construct six l,000-ton submarines for the German navy,33 a program that 
was later officially postponed. The WEU ceiling was raised to l,800 tons in 
1973. In the meantime, submarines have also become an important item of 
West German transfers of fighting ships to the Third World. By March 
1977, Peru and Argentina each had received two type-209 submarines, and 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each had two such boats under 
construction in German shipyards. 34 In February 1977 the federal 
government permitted Indonesia to order two type-206 submarines from 
Howaldtswerke/Deutsche Werft in KieJ.35 lt should be stressed that 1,000-
ton submarines so far have not been introduced into the Bundesmarine, 
and thus the 209-type submarines can be regarded as the first major weapon 
system the FRG produces solely for the purpose of wholesale export. 
Air Force 
Although the FRG's industry supplied a considerable proportion of the 
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second-generation equipment of the West German army and navy, for the 
air force the situation has been very different. Apart from transport and 
light utility aircraft, almost all planes were either bought from the U nited 
States or built in the FRG under U.S. licenses. So far, not a single 
operational combat aircraft of the Luftwaffe has been designed by the 
German aircraft industry. Exports of aircraft to nonindustrial states, 
therefore, have been restricted to Luftwaffe surplus trainers andjet fighters, 
a few helicopters, transports, and light liaison planes (Dornier Do-28), the 
last of which are suitable for counterinsurgency missions. 
This state of affairs is going to change rapidly when the two current 
large-scale projects being undertaken by the FRG aircraft industry in 
collaboration with those of France, Great Britain, and ltaly enter the 
production phase. For the French-German (Dassault-Breguet-Dornier) 
Alpha Jet, this is scheduled for August 1978. The Luftwaffe wants to 
replace its Fiat G-9ls with 175 close-support versions qf the Alpha Jet and 
plans to complete the transition by the end of 1981. The French air force 
will buy 215 trainer versions of the plane, and Belgium has ordered 33 
Alpha Jets. Turkey also has indicated its intention to purchase 52 to 56 
Alpha Jets, but so far no contract has been signed.36 Finlandand Egypt-
where flight demonstrations have already been performed-also seem 
interested in the plan, 37 with Egypt reportedly ready to purchase as many as 
120 aircraft. 
The West German aircraft industry's second major program is the Multi-
Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). Conceived in 1969, this product of British-
ltalian-German collaboration38 allegedly is tailored exactly to the needs of 
the Luftwaffe, 39 but there is ample evidence that the three cooperating 
countries have conflicting requirements and that the Luftwaffe has lost 
confidence in MRCA's versatility, as indicated by the decision to procure 
Alpha Jets for the close-support role that initially was to have been 
assumed by the MRCA. 40 The final decision on the production of a first 
consignment of MRCAs was taken in spring 1976. Production is scheduled 
to begin in late 1978, and the first l20aircraftare toreplace the navy's F-104 
G Starfighters. From 1982 to 1987, the Luftwaffe's Starfighters are tobe 
replaced by 202 MRCAs. 
Some of the problems plaguing the MRCA program worry the three 
cooperating countries not least because they establish almost insur-
mountable obstacles for the aircraft's export, even though its promoters do 
not tire of predicting demand from abroad. 41 The first deterrent to potential 
buyers is that production and further development will overlap for quite 
some time. The second headache is caused by the notorious mushrooming 
of the system's costs, which will raise unit prices to levels that will be 
prohibitive for most Third World nations and even NATO allies. In its 
conception phase, a unit price of $6 million was quoted. By now, unit 
prices of up to $18 million and thus system prices of around $27 million 
have appeared in print, 42 which implies that the FRG would have to spend 
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at least $6 billion on the procurement of its 322 MRCAs. As a result, 
officials in the three countries have given consideration to whether the 
increase in cost could be offset by a reduction in numbers, even though this 
would naturally drive up the system price even further and also severely cut 
into NATO's air power. In the MRCA's conception phase, the Luftwaffe 
estimated its needs at between 700 and 1,000 aircraft! 
All this indicates that MRCA is not likely to become a best-selling export, 
either to developed or to developing countries. Such a role seems more 
probable for the Alpha Jet or for Iess spectacular systems, as for instance the 
MBB Bo-105 helicopter, which, together with HOT missiles, forms a 
formidable antitank weapon. 43 But the more important problem for FRG's 
policy on arms transfers to the Third World might well become in the 
langer run not what to do about exports of the above Iist of modern and 
sophisticated weaponry designed for the West German army, navy, andair 
force, but how to dispose of the enormous amount of surplus arms that will 
be created when these new systems are phased in. By the middle to late 
l980s, thousands of Leopard ls and APCs, ten comparatively modern de-
stroyers and frigates, and hundreds of G-9ls and F-l04s will have become 
surplus, to name just the better-known systems. After the debacles over the 
disposal of the surplus generated by the replacement of the Bundeswehr's 
first-generation weapons, the federal government will probably be forced 
to take a more active role the next time. If the present trend continues, i.e„ if 
even the poorer NATO nations and the oil-rich states increasingly refuse 
second-hand armaments, only the Third World, or rather the "Fourth 
World," might remain as a market. Such a development would obviously 
require radical changes in the FRG's export policy. 
Economic Aspects of West German Arms Transfers 
to the Third World 
Earlier in this chapter, previous arms transfers from the FRG to the 
nonindustrial world were called a quantite negligeable. So far, ample 
evidence has been presented that they no langer fit that description and that 
West Germany's armaments industry certainly is no longer insignificant. 
The FRG, by national and cooperative design and production, is now 
approaching self-sufficiency in the field of military hardware and 
supplies. This trend is becoming obvious in the FRG's refusal to renew 
the offset agreement with the United States, which expired in 1975; with a 
few exceptions (e.g., TOW for airborne troops and Lance), there is little 
Bundeswehr demand for U.S. weapons. 44 
In the shipbuilding industry and the man ufacture of armor and antitank 
weapons, this economic success has been achieved without extensive 
government support, but rather as a spin-off from civilian production by 
way of technologkal superiority and deliberate exploitation of export 
markets within as weil as outside NATO. The West German aircraft 
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industry, on the other hand, owes its ascent largely to defense-related 
government orders and development contracts. After a series of failures and 
terminated programs, it was down and out in 1966-1967 andgetting ready 
for mass layoffs even among its 8,000 scientists and engineers, 45 but ils pleas 
for government aid did not go unheeded. The decision to proceed with the 
design of the MRCA as an advanced European combat aircraft instead of 
buying off the shelf in the United States thus also has tobe seen as part of a 
government rescue program for this ailing industry, in spite of strong 
verbal proclamations that the Bundeswehr would buy equipment where it 
was cheapest rather than guarantee a continuous flow of orders to West 
German industry. 46 Accordingly, the share of defense-related output in the 
FRG's aerospace industry amounts to 70-80 percent, but in most other 
sectors it runs from 5 to 10 percent.47 
Regardless of the reasons, the steady upswing of the armaments industry 
has led to a considerable export drive, which has been openly supported by 
the federal government as a contribution to standardization of weapons 
among NATO allies. The most recent example of this is Defense Minister 
Georg Leber's effort to get the United States to adopt at least a few 
componentsof the Leopard 2 MBTforits XM-1 tank. Topromote Leopard 
1 sales to Belgium, Norway, and Holland, the FRG concluded offset deals 
that obliged it to place civilian and military orders in those countries 
amounting to a certain percentage of the Leopard deals. 48 
The economic arguments in favor of stronger export orientation 
regarding weapons and military supplies have already obtained such 
international acceptance that a detailed examination is unnecessary. The 
standard arguments are, of course, the leading role of military technology, 
which-if pursued on a large enough basis-produces spillover effects for 
civilian technology as well as the economies of scale that can be attained by 
larger production runs. In the context of West European defense 
collaboration, this latter argument has led to absurd consequences. By 
producing for the larger European market, the FRG hoped to avoid the 
need to export to countries outside NATO. But at the same time, European 
defense collaboration encouraged participating countries to embark on 
projects-such as the MRCA-that are so grand in scope and for which 
demand among European NATO nations is so low that hopes are again 
turning to the export market to achieve economies of scale. 
The debate in West Germany over arms transfers to the Third World has 
by no means been restricted to these classical arguments. Proponents of a 
more "liberal'' policy have argued that developing countries often wish to 
conclude "package deals "-for instance, to buy a cannon or a tank plus an 
ammunition factory-so that if a prospective seller restricts the export of 
one of the package's items, the order probably will go somewhere else. As 
West German industry is heavily dependent upon exports, this argument 
has also been presented in a "civilian" version, which is that Third World 
buyers will often reward the supplier of desired military hardware by 
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placing civilian orders in the same country or deliver appropriate 
"punishment" if export licenses are withheld. More generally, armaments 
transfers are treated as a sales promotion device for forthcoming mili tary or 
civilian transactions or both. 49 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this kind of promotion did not receive 
much attention. Since civilian production and exports were still 
expanding rapidly and since the German labor market was among the 
tightest in the world, Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt could afford an 
outright rejection of all considerations aimed at expanding the FRG's 
weapons exports to countries outside NAT0.50 But after the general 
economic crisis of the West had been aggravated by the Arab oil embargo 
and the subsequent price hike, the standard set of arguments began to 
reappear in defense-related circles with growing frequency and intensity, 
and a series of new considerations was added. First, a more active role for 
the FRG as an exporter of arms would increase the number of orders and 
thus smooth the effects of major fluctuations in Bundeswehr and NATO 
demand, which, under the impact of the crisis, could no longer be readily 
compensated by civilian demand. Second, the labor market could be 
stabilized, and additional jobs could be created in armaments industries.51 
Together, these lines of reasoning produced a more permissive stance 
toward arms transfers to the Third World as an instrument of economic 
policy to fight the recession. 
These recent developments have also led to a realignment in the ranks of 
those favoring or opposing current export restrictions. In the past, the 
FRG's unions have always strictly opposed West German arms deals with 
developing countries, but there are indications that union representatives 
from armaments factories have begun to join the export drive and that their 
nationwide unions will tolerate, if not support, their activities.52 In view of 
the close association between the unions and the SPD, this means 
increasing pressure on parliament and government, in addition to that 
already exerted by the industry itself and its contacts in the CDU. Whether 
this process might possibly be reversed again by a more permanent 
economic upswing remains to be seen. lt is highly unlikely that the 
industry will drop its own efforts to obtain a more permissive environment 
for its arms deals when the economy picks up. 
Some Special Arrangements for West German Arms Transfers 
to the Third World 
Direct exports of German-made weapons are only one way of 
transferring armaments to the Third World. Historically, at least three less 
conspicuous procedures have been employed, i.e., the export of plants and 
licenses, foreign assembly arrangements, and multinational projects. So 
far, the first has been the most prominent, but the second and third are 
growing in importance and might well make up the bulk of the FRG's 
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weapons exports to nonindustrial states in the future. 
Exports of Plants and Licenses 
In the 1960s, West German industry began to build small arms and 
ammunition factories in developing countries-for instance, in Guinea, 
Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, and Burma-and licenses to produce German-
designed weapons were granted to many more countries.53 Those 
transactions were often part of military assistance programs, but in recent 
years they have become more and more commercial. Recipients have 
become more numerous, and licenses have also been granted for major 
weapons systems.54 
Iran has probabl y become the outstanding example of the export of West 
German weapons and ammunition factories and licenses to the Third 
World. In 1969 Iran wanted to purchase 1,000 Leopard tanks but was 
turned down. In 1974, however, after the oil embargo, Iran received 
equipment for tank maintenance, and West German firms started to build 
ammunition plants in Iran, the output of which will be larger than that of 
the FRG's own ammunition plants.55 In addition, Iran negotiated for the 
construction of plants for tank engines, tracks, and guns by the very same 
companies that produce engines, tracks, and guns for the Leopard 2 tank. 56 
The federal government has not objected, since it no langer considers Iran 
tobe an area of tension. lt is expected that Iran will ask for licenses to build 
the Leopard 2 as soon as its development is completed and the Bundeswehr 
begins to phase it in. 
Control is obviously the main problem involved in exporting factories 
and blueprints for the production of weapons and ammunition in 
developing countries. Such transactions are generally far less conspicuous 
than the transfer of complete weapons systems, so they occasionally go 
unnoticed. More important, the legal basis for restricting them is far from 
complete. Even though the Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade 
Act also pertain to tools, substances, and know-how required for the 
production of arms, there are large loopholes. If, for instance, a 
multipurpose machine tool is suitable for the manufacture of lipstick 
containers as well as small-arm ammunition, there is no way of 
constraining its export or insisting upon a guarantee that only lipstick will 
be produced by the recipient country. 
Foreign Assembly 
A second way of bypassing West German export restrictions, especially 
on major weapons, is to deliver segments and parts of a system to a partner 
firm in the recipient country or in a third country, which then assembles 
the final product and possibly markets it in its own name. West German 
firms thus appear only as suppliers of prefabricated parts. This 
arrangement was adopted for the construction of the l,000-ton type-209 
submarines for Argentina and Greece, since the FRG, at the time of 
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negouauons, was not yet permitted to build boats of this size. Experts 
doubt, however, whether Argentina's shipyards could actually have 
assembled submarine sections without massive outside help, so that the 
WEU permission to produce submarines of up to 1,800 tons, granted to the 
FRG in 1973, arrived just in time. 
With a few exceptions, developing countries will rarely have the 
technology necessary to assemble sophisticated weapons systems from their 
components; thus, third countries with sufficient industrial capacities and 
Iess restrictive arms export policies are required to perform this task. 
Currently, at least two large-scale projects of this sort are under way. In 
Italy, Oto Melara is building the prototypes of a main battle tank called the 
Lion, which is nothing but a copy of the Leopard. More than half of its 
components are directly imported from West Germany, the rest are 
manufactured in Italy under German licenses, and the license for the gun 
comes from Great Britain. The Li0n, the advertisements for which are 
expressly aimed at Third World and especially Arab markets, is to enter 
production in 1977.57 
The second example of foreign assembly of German weapons for the 
Third World is the Marder APC, ofwhich SaudiArabia wants to buy 600to 
800. The final decisions have not yet been made, but it is likely that either 
the Belgian branch of Rheinstahl, the Marder' s original manufacturer, or a 
French firm will be responsible for assembly and export. 58 As noresistance 
to the Lion and Marder enterprises has yet materialized, the armaments 
lobby has begun to hail foreign assembly arrangements as the future way 
out of the "thickets of West German export restrictions," and such 
arrangements may well be applied to other systems and other recipients as 
weil. 
Multinational Projects 
Multinational European production of weapons for the FRG has a 
langer history than foreign assembly, but since it was largely confined in 
the 1960s to manufacture under U.S. licenses, there was no collision with 
established export policies. On the other hand, most current multinational 
programs in which the FRG is involved are of genuine European design. 
The rationale for these projects, of course, is standardization as well as the 
attempt to achieve economies of scale to the extent permitted by the 
European market. From the point of view of the FRG's arms-producing 
industry-and perhaps that of the federal government as well-a most 
attractive side effect is that the responsibility for export is blurred; further-
more, all of the FRG's partners in joint ventures pursue far more permisive 
policies toward transferring weapons to countries outside NATO. 
Thus, it becomes possible to cash in on the revenues from the export 
of weapons, which in part have been designed and built in the FRG but 
which have been soldandexported bysome othercountrywithout the West 
German government's ever becoming involved. The extremely high 
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proportion of multinational weapons projects in the West German 
industry' s development and production program, therefore, may well be 
due not only to military and economic considerations but also to the desire 
to bypass official export restrictions. 59 
West Germany's advanced and major weapons programs include an 
unusually high proportion of multinational projects: MILAN, HOT, and 
Roland missiles, FH-70 and SP-70, Alpha Jet, and MRCA. Future transfers 
of these systems to third parties naturally depend upon the agreements that 
were concluded when these multinational projects were established, but 
unfortunately such contracts remain secret. lt is not hard to imagine, 
however, that France and Great Britain, as traditional suppliers of weapons 
to developing nations and to areas of tension, have not agreed to subject 
themselves to official West German policy. There are even rumors about a 
German-French agreement requiring both governments not to impede 
each other's exports of jointly produced weapons and to supply nationally 
built components of joint systems if the other partner has accepted an 
export order.60 
The possible pattern of future sales of these multinational projects to 
Third World buyers has already been foreshadowed. In spite of the West 
German adherence to the UN embargo, France sold nine copies of the-
otherwise not particularly successful-French-German Transall transport 
plane to South Africa. Another major deal of this sort is probably 
forthcoming: during his visit to the FRG in spring 1976, Egypt's President 
Anwar Sadat reiterated his country's desire to purchase 120 Alpha Jets. The 
FRG's foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, commented that those 
planes "are not for sale in the FRG." However, this statement is by no 
means a veto, though a veto would have accorded with the FRG's principle 
not to export arms to areas of tension. lt has since been interpreted to mean 
that Egypt could buy the planes from France without objection from the 
FRG and that the West German share of production of the planes 
scheduled for Egypt might temporarily be transferred to France. This latter 
plan probably is meant to mollify Israel, but it does not sound very 
plausible: Egypt is interested in the German close-support version of the 
Alpha Jet, not in the French trainers. 
Conclusion: The Present and the Future 
The FRG's policy on arms transfers to the nonindustrial world, unlike 
those of other industrialized countries has not been overly permissive, and 
in recent years there have been efforts to tighten the net still further. Parallel 
to these efforts, however, commercial weapons exports have grown, and 
arrangements have appeared that render the existing restrictions largely 
irrelevant. We thus have a mixed record: declaratory government policy 
sticks to established dogmas, which, in practice, have been increasingly 
eroded. For the federal government, this is probably not the warst solution, 
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since it allows an adaptation to new developments without having to revise 
one's principles. 
The force behind West German sales of weapons to the Third World is 
the FRG's armaments industry. Initially, it was predominantly geared to 
meet Bundeswehr and NATO needs, but in a lang and quiet export phase, 
it learned about the demand for its products and the attractiveness of Third 
World markets. By now, it has the instruments to exploit these markets 
more actively even without changes in official policy, although it would 
still like to see some policy changes and exerts its influence to achieve that 
goal. The oil embargo and the economic crunch have considerably 
advanced these efforts and have brought strange bedfellows-union 
representatives and even left-wing social democrats-to the support of the 
industry' s demands. The federal governmen t has th us come under growing 
pressures from diverse sides to adapt its norms to what is more and more 
becoming reality. 
The issue before us, therefore, is not whether West German arms 
transfers to nonindustrial states will increase. They will. Instead, the issue 
is whether this will take place by bypassing the restrictions established in 
the 1960s, or within a more permissive framework of government 
regulations. After the narrow victory of Helmut Schmidt's coalition 
government in the October 1976 elections, a wholesale revision of export 
constraints is as unlikely as a renewed attempt to enforce the SPD's 
expressly declared principle to cut back weapons sales to developing 
nations. Instead, a continuation of the "split morals" policy should be 
expected, with a broader interpretation of what constitutes an "area of 
tension" paving the way for the transition to what previously has been 
referred to as an "open commercial phase." In addition, still more leeway 
will probably be given to transfer arrangements bypassing the traditional 
prohibitions. 
If the Christian Democrats should return to power in the 1980 elections 
or after an earlier collapse of the present coalition, the process might not 
differ greatly. lt is true that several leading politicians from the CDU, 
especially from the CSU, have doser ties to defense-related industries and 
that they have frequently supported their demands. On the other hand, it is 
one thing to endorse a totally permissive policy on the export of armaments 
when you are in the opposition; it is quite another thing to implement such 
a policy once in office. The CDU would also have to reckon with internal as 
well as international public opinion, which, so far, has been anything but 
favorable toward the FRG's sales of armaments to developing countries. 
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that a CDU-led government's policy 
would possibly differ in degree but certainly not in principle from the 
current government's policy. 
Another prospect for the future concerns the fact that, before long, the 
FRG will be the major European source of surplus weapons. If there 
should be strong demand for these armaments from Third World markets 
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but little demand from elsewhere, the federal government will be in an 
unpleasant situation, since it has itself assumed responsibility for the 
disposal of such weapons as a result of the discouraging incidents of the 
mid-1960s. lt therefore could not avoid-in contrast to commercial sales of 
new weapons-becoming directly involved again in large-scale transfers to 
the Third World. This might well lead to a repetition of the embarrassment 
over the disposal of the Bundeswehr's first-generation equipment and thus 
prove more detrimental to West Germany's foreign relations than the 
transition into the "open commercial phase" of its arms transfers to 
nonindustrial states. 
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